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An Economist in Government: 
Views of a Presidential Advisor 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum 
As the old saw put it, "Economics is what 
economists do." Judging by both my per-
sonal experience and observation of the 
work of others, I would state that the quota-
tion also accurately describes the role of 
economists in government. But, since I am 
cognizant of the great variation possible in 
the role-and of the numerous factors deter-
mining that variation- I am content merely 
to describe the role of one economist during 
one tour in Washington. 
Based on my service as Chairman of the 
President's Council of Economic Advisers 
from January 1981 to August 1982, I would 
conclude that the role varies substantially 
over time and that it is a changing blend of 
participation in policymaking and preaching 
of economic doctrine, both within the gov-
ernment and to the public. 
It would be pleasant to report that those 
who disagreed with me were generally 
wrong and, if pressed, I might be willing to 
provide some factual buttressing for that 
position. Nevertheless, self-serving state-
ments would not be helpful to the reader. 
Instead, I have tried-albeit likely not with 
total success-to avoid writing the modern 
day equivalent of "An Impartial History of 
the Civil War as Reported by John 
Tecumseh Sherman." 
Dr. Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished Univer-
sity Professor and Director of the Center for the Study 
of American Business at Washington University in 
St. Louis. 
I attempt to concentrate on the process by 
which an official economist participates in 
the policymaking process. Moreover, I write 
this with the clear knowledge that few if any 
decisions in government policy-be they 
labeled economic or social or foreign af-
fairs-are made solely or even primarily on 
I have tried to avoid writing the modern day 
equivalent of "An Impartial History of the 
Civil War as Reported by 
John Tecumseh Sherman" 
the basis of economic analysis or informa-
tion from economists. Yet I also came away 
with the knowledge that most questions of 
governmental policymaking-especially 
those labeled "non-economic" -do contain 
important economic influences. 
Developing the Economic Program 
At the outset of the Reagan Administra-
tion, for example, the major role of the CEA 
Chairman was to participate in the develop-
ment of the President's Economic Recovery 
Program. The initial tax program had been 
set during the 1980 campaign: across-the-
board personal income tax rate reductions 
plus liberalization of business depreciation 
allowances. Thus, the emphasis was on 
developing the initial package of budget 
cuts. My appointment to the three-man 
Budget Working Group chaired by Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Director 
David Stockman meant that a major part of 
my time and effort was devoted to reviewing 
proposed expenditure reductions and to 
convincing the department heads to go 
along with them. One Cabinet secretary was 
quoted as saying that Stockman and I con-
stituted a "good cop-bad cop" routine. As 
someone who grew up in the old Budget 
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Bureau in the 1950s it was perhaps in-
evitable that I played the bad cop. But that 
function was destined to remain with the 
CEA chairman in many subsequent connec-
tions. Surely, I came to advocate rather con-
sistently much larger budget cuts than those 
approved. 
The economic "White Paper" of February 
18, 1981, entitled A Program for Economic 
Recovery, constituted a landmark in the 
development of President Reagan's 
economic program. That document an-
nounced the four pillars of the program-
tax cuts, budget cuts, regulatory relief, and 
monetary restraint. It also contained the 
economic assumptions underlying the 
revenue and expenditure estimates. 
Few if any decisions in government policy 
are made solely or even primarily 011 the 
basis of ec01wmic analysis or information 
from economists 
As the person who took on the respon-
sibility for the White Paper, I instantly 
found myself in pitched battles with both 
supply-siders and monetarists. Without 
repeating all the doctrinal disputes that oc-
curred, I still vividly recall the fervor of 
those arguments, which at times bordered 
on the theological. In any event, I under-
stood the role of the Chairman of the CEA 
not as a means of preaching supply-side 
economics or monetarism, but rather of 
helping the President develop and carry out 
his economic program. Thus, my insistence 
that a modest period of recession would 
accompany the imposition of monetary re-
straint was viewed by the supply-siders as a 
lack of faith in the instantaneous nature of 
the economy's response to the tax cuts. Sim-
ilarly, my unwillingness to include, for the 
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guidance of the Federal Reserve System, a 
set of specific annual targets for monetary 
growth left the monetarists dismayed. 
I understood the role of CEA Chairman not 
as a means of preaching supply-side 
ecmwmics or monetarism, but rather of 
helping the President develop and carry out 
his economic program 
During this period, I felt a kinship with 
Lewis Carroll's Alice. In Through the Look-
ing Glass, Alice says, "There's no use trying, 
we can't believe impossible things." "I dare-
say you haven't had much practice," replies 
the Queen. "When I was your age, I always 
did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, some-
times I've believed as many as six impossi-
ble things before breakfast." 
Selling the Economic Program 
After the release of the White Paper, the 
CEA chairman became one of the three ma-
jor "salesmen" (along with Treasury 
Secretary Donald Regan, and the OMB 
Director) for the President's economic pro-
gram-aside from the "number one com-
municator" himself. There followed an 
almost endless array of joint and individual 
congressional testimonies and press con-
ferences; White House briefings to the 
Cabinet, other officials, and numerous 
visiting interest groups; and speeches, 
speeches, speeches to all sorts of organiza-
tions-business, consumers, agriculture, 
ethnic, regional, religious, etc. 
I reached a point that when I was out for 
a meal and the waiters began to clear the 
dishes, I automatically got ready to stand up 
and speak. At first I referred to the speechi-
fying as economic education and then mar-
keting. Subsequently, however, I found my-
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self using the term "forensic economics" to 
describe the activity. I was defending the 
product that I had helped to design, includ-
ing the inevitable compromises that anyone 
would reluctantly agree to. 
I reached a point that whe11 I was out for a 
meal and the waiters bega11 to clear the 
dishes, I automatically got ready 
to stand up a11d speak 
In addition, since there is an important in-
ternational dimension to economic policy, a 
wide array of ambassadors and economic 
and finance ministers from other nations 
frequently came by for discussions ranging 
from the courtesy call to the substanti~e. As 
chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Eco-
nomic Policy Committee of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, I carried at times a significant repre-
sentational load for what was a rather con-
troversial set of policies. As chairman of the 
Economic Policy Committee, I had key op-
portunities to work with my counterparts in 
other nations to develop positions and draft 
communiques with which we felt comforta-
ble and which other nations would accept. 
Informally, the EPC chairmanship enabled 
me at key points to unruffle the feathers of 
foreign representatives who had been upset 
by earlier, "harder line" American presenta-
tions. 
I did not see my public role as a11 ecmwmic 
"oracle" aloof from the foibles of anJ' si1ti11g 
administration There is no shortage of that 
type of expertise in the private sector 
I must admit that I felt no reluctance to 
play the public role the President assigned 
to me-to serve as a senior representative 
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of his Administration at a time when the ap-
proval of his economic program by the Con-
gress was an essential step in converting 
economic ideas to economic reality. Thus, I 
did not see my public role as an economic 
"oracle" aloof from the foibles of any sitting 
administration. After all, there is no short-
age of that type of expertise in the private 
sector. 
The Day-to-Day Routine 
Simultaneously, the development of a host 
of detailed government programs and poli-
cies was taking place inside the Administra-
tion. An important structural change was 
the institution of Cabinet Councils tore-
place the host of interagency committees 
that typically had been organized by the 
White House in the past. The CEA chairman 
is an active member of three of those cabi-
net-level groups-Economic Affairs, Com-
merce and Trade, and Natural Resources 
and Environment-and attends the meet-
ings of the other councils (Human Resources, 
Food and Agriculture, Legal Policy). 
Members of the CEA and its senior staff 
serve on the various working groups and 
task forces. 
The CEA was expected to, and predictably 
did, oppose each and every proposal to sub-
sidize some segment of the ec0110my, or to 
shield a specific industry from competition 
The effectiveness of the CEA on any speci-
fic issue discussed by these groups depends 
in part on the cogency of its analysis. But 
that is not always the case. For example, we 
won the battle to eliminate import restric-
tions on shoes, but lost the struggle to con-
tain restrictions on imports of textiles. Was 
it coincidental that the Congressional dele-
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gation to the White House urging textile 
quotas was led by a senior southern Repub-
lican who was diligently working for the en-
actment of the President's program, while 
the shoe delegation was chaired by a promi-
nent Northeastern liberal Democrat? 
The Cabinet Council system ensures that 
the CEA is represented in the decision mak-
ing apparatus that handles a host of issues-
social security, foreign trade, regulation of 
financial institutions, transportation, envir-
onment, energy, agriculture, etc. At key 
points, the President attends a Cabinet 
Council meeting and, at times, makes a deci-
sion on the spot. In this regard, the key role 
of the CEA was not to develop additional, 
brave new programs, but to operate a dam-
age limitation mechanism. Thus, the CEA (at 
least in my time) was expected to, and pre-
dictably did, oppose each and every propos-
al to subsidize some segment of the econ-
omy, or to shield a specific industry from 
competition. At times, a Cabinet member 
proposing some additional form of govern-
ment intervention in the economy would 
start off by saying, "Mr. President, Murray 
will probably give you a different view, 
but. .. " 
We did not win all the protectionist 
battles, but each and every propo11ent of 
additional government involveme11t in the 
private sector k11ew that he or she 
would have to do battle 
In the case of protectionism, we did not 
win all the battles, but each proponent of 
additional governmental involvement in the 
private sector knew that he or she would 
have to do battle. In certain instances-
autos and maritime, for example-we were 
hampered by Presidential campaign com-
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mitments. I found myself grudgingly admir-
ing a sitting President who took his cam-
paign oratory seriously. 
The Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs 
was a forum in which I presented analyses 
of economic developments. Frequently, the 
President and Vice President attended, and 
my presentation would set off an informal 
discussion on economic policy generally. 
One Administration wag parodied a presen-
tation of mine in the form of a fictitious 
memo from "Murray Weidenbomber" (see 
Exhibit A). I like to believe, however, that 
my use of "economicese" was not quite as 
arcane as this parody might lead one to 
believe. 
Meetings, of course, are the basis-and 
bane-of a bureaucrat's existence. Surely, a 
major part of the CEA chairman's time is 
taken up by participating in meetings with 
other Cabinet-level officials. An important 
example is the Task Force on Regulatory 
Relief, chaired by the Vice President. 
Members of this group served as the chief 
"honchos" of regulatory reform, overseeing 
the operation of the executive order direct-
ing agencies to perform benefit/cost analysis 
for proposed regulations and assigning im-
portant review responsibilities to OMB. 
The Task Force also furnished an instance 
of the need to establish personal priorities. 
Regulatory relief, for me, was a labor of 
love. As an academic, I had written on the 
subject widely. My initial tie to the Presi-
dent was that body of work, which he had 
drawn upon frequently in his radio broad-
casts and columns as a private citizen. Also, 
I had chaired the task force on regulation 
during the campaign and the transition 
period. At key points I was expected to, and 
did, participate in setting regulatory policy. 
Yet, I knew that if I participated on a day-to-
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Exhibit A 
Memorandum for Cabinet Council on 
Economic Affairs 
From: Murray Weidenbomber 
Date: April 19, 1982 
Re: Economic Outlook-Balance of 1982 
Banking figures show an easing of the 
rate at which business is easing off. This 
can be taken as ample proof of the govern-
ment's contention that there's a slowing up 
of the slowdown. 
Now, to clarify that, it should be noted 
that a slowing up of the slowdown is not as 
good as an upturn of the downturn. On the 
other hand, it's a good deal better than 
either a speedup of the slowdown or a 
deepening of the downturn. Also, it suggests 
that the climate is about right for an ad-
justment of the re-adjustment to rate 
structures. 
Now, turning specifically to rates, we find 
a very definite decreasing in the rate of in-
crease. This clearly shows there should be a 
letting up of the letdown. Of course, if the 
slowdown should speed up, the decrease in 
the rate of increase of rates would turn into 
an increase in the rate of decrease. 
And finally, the inflation of the recession 
would turn the recession into a depression, 
while a deflation in the rate of inflation 
would give the impression of a recession of 
the depression. 
day basis, the time available for macroeco-
nomic policy would suffer. Thus, I devoted-
as does almost every CEA chairman-most 
of my time and efforts to macro matters. 
For example, the CEA chairman-along 
with the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Director of OMB-constitute the economic 
"Troika." That informal group, which has 
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survived through many administrations, 
typically meets weekly to review the eco-
nomic outlook and the course of economic 
policy. At times, the Troika meetings are ex-
panded to include the President and/or 
senior White House staff. On a few occa-
sions, the chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board attended. George Shultz, when he 
became Secretary of State, also attended 
most meetings, and the Assistant to the 
President for Domestic Affairs was a regu-
lar participant. 
I found myself grudgingly admiri11g a sitti11g 
President who took his campaign 
oratory seriously 
The Troika is the mechanism by which the 
Administration's economic projections are 
developed. At times, key budgetary and 
economic policy changes go through infor-
mal mechanisms (such as that embodied in 
the Troika and the senior White House staff) 
rather than the formal Cabinet and Cabinet 
Council organizations. 
One administrative, yet strategic, set of 
meetings is the daily gathering of the White 
House senior staff, which the CEA chairman 
regularly attends. This is an important com-
munication device, providing a ready oppor-
tunity to raise issues and policy questions 
and to push along specific matters. For ex-
ample, an Administration position paper on 
trade policy had been drafted at one point, 
emphasizing a strong free trade orientation. 
Although substantive agreement had been 
reached by all relevant parties, the docu-
ment itself was stuck in the Administration's 
paperflow. My merely noting the delay led 
to an on-the-spot decision to release this im-
portant document. 
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Briefing the President 
Of course, the direct contacts with the 
President are of very special importance. 
Because I take the role of trusted advisor 
seriously, there are some matters that I will 
pass over. I do recall, however, discussing 
the subject of gold with him on several occa-
sions, a matter that he had studied at some 
length. During the campaign and earlier, he 
had indicated strong interest in restoring 
the gold standard. As a member of the Gold 
Commission (set up under a 1980 law), I told 
him that I would pursue the matter with an 
open mind. Subsequently, we reported that 
the majority of the Commission opposed a 
return to gold at this time. That disposed of 
the matter. I see that episode as another ex-
ample of the CEA's damage-limitation func-
tion or the avoidance of economic harm. 
"We do 1101 live in a seasonally 
adjusted world" 
Another important function is to keep the 
President abreast of current economic de-
velopments. In addition to sending out a reg-
ular flow of analytic reports, the CEA chair-
man alerts the President to impending re-
leases of economic news. Thus, the evening 
before the Consumer Price Index report for 
a given month is issued, the President has 
on his desk a memo from the CEA chairman 
setting forth the highlights. At times he will 
call for amplification. We had a pleasant-
but spirited and extended-difference of 
views on the matter of seasonally adjusted 
versus unadjusted reports on employment 
and unemployment. We ultimately resolved 
this matter by my providing him both sets 
of data, together with suitable caveats. 
An insight into my approach to my job 
related to that less-than-momentous issue. 
II 
After hearing me out fully, the President 
decided that he would use the unadjusted 
data in a speech. I then suggested a sentence 
to explain his position: "We do not live in a 
seasonally adjusted world." He promptly in-
serted it into his speech. 
The Economic Report 
The February 18, 1981, White Paper con-
stituted the first major opportunity in the 
Reagan Administration to put specific poli-
cies in a broader economic context, but it 
was followed by many others. The most im-
portant, of course, is the annual Ec0110mic 
Report of the President. The President's 
message, written by the CEA, has for many 
years been quite short. The great bulk of the 
document is technically the Annual Report 
of the Council of Economic Advisers. This is 
a joint effort of the three members of the 
Council and the entire staff of the Council. 
The Annual Report also provides some op-
portunity to raise new issues and to move 
policy along. 
For example, it was widely known in 
Washington that I had advocated making 
some reductions in the rapidly expanding 
military budget. This was a subject area in 
which I had done research for over two 
decades. As the first economist to raise 
public concern about the inflationary im-
pact of the Vietnam buildup, I believe I had 
The 1982 Economic Report of the CEA raised 
serious questio11s about the ec0110mic 
feasibility of the Administratio11's 
defense program 
some credibility. Thus, the 1982 Economic 
Report was, I believe, the first one that 
raised serious questions about the economic 
feasibility of the defense program of the Ad-
ministration then in office. 
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With regard to the annual Report, it is ap-
propriate to mention the role of the CEA 
staff. As is customary with a change in ad-
ministration, I inherited the staff recruited 
by my Democratic predecessor. Except for 
career statisticians and secretaries, the staff 
consisted of non-career appointees, most of 
whom were on leave from their respective 
universities. After a short period of adjust-
ment, I found each and every one of them a 
loyal and dedicated professional economist. 
In fact, I asked several of them to stay on. In 
any event, both the original CEA staff and 
their replacements were, with very few ex-
ceptions, extremely helpful in carrying out 
the disparate functions of the agency. I 
relied very heavily on the two members of 
the Council, but I would probably embar-
rass them if I embellished upon that. 
If the Presidency is a bully pulpit, the CEA 
chairmanship is a most elevated lectureship 
The Elevated Lectureship 
If the Presidency is a bully pulpit, the 
CEA chairmanship is a most elevated lec-
tureship. As I look back on my experiences 
in that office, I find that I used the position 
to develop four themes: (1} economic free-
dom is closely intertwined with personal 
liberty, (2} business-government relations 
should be characterized by less intervention 
by government, (3) free trade is the interna-
tional combination of these two themes, and 
(4} it is necessary, from time to time, to take 
a swipe at business' pleas for special privi-
leges. Clearly, these four points are closely 
connected. 
Appropriately enough, I devoted my entire 
address to the Freedoms Foundation at 
Valley Forge on May 8, 1981, to the subject 
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of "Freedom and Economics." A key excerpt 
follows: 
When the frenetic events of the day are 
evaluated in the more leisurely light of 
history, I am confident that we will find 
that we have been engaged in an effort far 
more fundamental than raising the growth 
rate of the real GNP or slowing the pace 
of the Consumer Price Index, worthy as 
these actions may be. 
We are engaged in an unprecedented ef-
fort to shift the focus of decision-making 
away from the Federal government and to 
the many diverse and smaller organiza-
tions and institutions that better serve the 
individual ... [This is] part of a larger task: 
to reduce the power and obtrusiveness of 
the Federal government in all of its many 
dimensions. 
I embellished on this theme in an inter-
view a few months later: 
I am fascinated by the fact that when 
you take away the legal frontier between 
the communist sector and the capitalistic 
sector and you let people move, you can 
predict the direction in which they will 
move. 
The CEA chairman has a national and at 
times international audience. Early in the 
Administration, in March 1981, I presented 
a lecture to the Woodrow Wilson Center at 
the Smithsonian Institution in which I 
sketched out the economic justification for 
a reduced governmental role in society. I 
was pleased to see the very wide distribu-
tion of this speech-including reprints of 
reprints-which resulted. Here is a typical 
excerpt: 
Resort to regulation should always be 
the last step in dealing with a problem, 
not the first or second. Further, before 
regulating, we should be certain that the 
world will be in better shape with regula-
14 
tion than without it. Any time the govern-
ment resorts to regulation, we run the 
risk that the market system will suffer 
unintended, incremental damage as a side-
effect. The presumption should be in 
favor of private decision-making. If we 
cannot demonstrate that regulation will 
lead to a superior outcome than the pre-
sent state of affairs, we should refrain 
from loading yet another requirement or 
prohibition onto the American economic 
system. 
The international dimension of these con-
cepts is that if you scratch an economist, 
you will find a free trader. In a variety of 
Congressional appearances and public 
speeches, I presented the case for free trade, 
"Before regulating, we should be certain that 
the world will be in better shape with regula-
cion tha11 without it .... The presumption 
should be in favor of private 
decision-making" 
speaking in a language that at times seems 
arcane to economists-plain English. My 
testimony to a joint hearing of the Senate 
Banking and Finance Committees on July 9, 
1981, made that point: 
The benefits of trade are nearly always 
a two-way street. Competition, whether 
domestic or international, fosters efficient 
allocation of resources into relatively 
more productive activities; better prod-
ucts, at lower prices, appear in the mar-
ketplace. Consumer choice is expanded; 
inflationary pressures are reduced. 
It is sad to report that the general support 
of business executives for these free market 
principles is far too often overwhelmed by 
their advocacy of specific benefits to their 
industry or company-always justified, of 
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course, on an "exceptions" basis. I raised 
that point initially in a speech to the com-
mittee for Economic Development on May 
21, 1981: "It is important to support, pro-
tect, and defend the private enterprise 
system, and sometimes you have to do that 
in face of the opposition of individual en-
trepreneurs." I subsequently spelled out my 
response in "The Case Against Bailouts," 
delivered to the Pennsylvania Bankers Asso-
ciation on May 25, 1982. Here is a small por-
tion of that speech: 
Bailouts send the wrong signal because 
they tell people-investors as well as 
businessmen-that they do not have to 
worry about investment risks and cost 
overruns, that the Federal government 
will always come to their rescue and 
pump up their incomes by open or hidden 
subsidies. 
I prese11ted the case for free trade, speaki11g 
i11 a language that at times seems arcmte to 
ec0110mists-plai11 E11glish 
The View from the Outside 
For a teacher, the rewards of service to 
the President were considerable, albeit 
psychic. One give-and-take session on na-
tional television gave me the chance to ex-
plain aspects of the economy to a far large1· 
audience than a college professor normally 
can generate in a lifetime. Witness this ex-
cerpt from a session on Meet the Press on 
August 30, 1981: 
Question: You've talked about the im-
portance of reducing inflation. How do 
you think that your tight fiscal and money 
policies feed through to fight inflation? 
How do they affect wages and prices 
throughout the economy? 
Dr. Weide11baum: By setting in motion 
basic factors, ... the slower availability of 
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money and credit ... will restrain ... the 
pressures for wage and price increases 
that can't be supported by the market. 
As a result, we will see in the years 
ahead wage and price decisions which 
have a much lower inflationary potential 
than the actions we've seen in the past, 
because the basic external environment in 
which wages and prices are set is being 
changed. That is, the inflationary environ-
ment is being wound down. 
All in all, I have an upbeat feeling about 
the state of economics. Although we often 
read that economics is in disarray and that 
economists are as predictably wrong as the 
economy remains unpredictable, I for one 
am not prepared to don sackcloth and ashes 
and recite from the Book of Lamentations. 
Looki11g at the i11tellectual wreckage of re-
cel1t years, I am impressed at how much 
11011sense we have wtleamed and how many 
old and more modest but harder truths have 
been co11{irmed 
Looking at the intellectual wreckage of re-
cent years, I am impressed at how much 
nonsense we have unlearned and how many 
old and more modest but harder truths have 
been confirmed. 
Frankly, I find it a relief that so many 
brave new theories-always bolstered or 
perhaps obscured by weighty mathematical 
dressing-have been discredited. My case in 
point is supply-side economics, especially as 
it was espoused in its most unequivocal-
and hence most widely reported-version: 
cut tax rates and you simply and quickly un-
leash the latent strength of a dynamic econ-
omy. The sudden onrush of work, saving 
and investment supposedly will generate 
such new heights of production and income 
that we will no longer have to worry about 
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budget deficits. In fact, one of the "high 
priests" contended that deficits would be 
declining so rapidly that we would be able 
to expand government spending simultane-
ously with the reductions in tax rates! 
In retrospect, spouting that sort of non-
sense was a lot of fun-especially on the 
part of those who stayed on the sidelines 
and carefully avoided taking the responsibil-
ities of office. Thus, the important kernel of 
truth in supply-side economics was sub-
merged by a plethora of bombastic prom-
ises. The kernel of truth, of course, is the 
The important kernel of truth in supply-
side economics was submerged by a 
plethora of bombastic promises. 
substance of traditional, conservative eco-
nomics-not startingly new, but vitally im-
portant. It may surprise those with short 
memories that the concern with the adverse 
effects of high tax rates and the need to en-
courage saving and investment were staples 
of pre-Lafferite conservative economic 
thought. These concerns were neither in-
vented nor discovered on a cocktail napkin, 
nor on the editorial pages of a daily newspa-
per. 
But important economic concepts regard-
ing taxation, savings, and investment were 
embellished-and that is what made them, 
at least for a while, so saleable. Alas, the in-
stant cure was not forthcoming. But the 
kernel of truth, the undramatic but fun-
damental underpinnings of modern conser-
vative thought, are as pertinent as ever. 
I returned to the private sector with no 
grand l~ssons. I came away grateful for the 
opportunity to speak my mind and to know 
that decision makers in government were 
listening to at least one economist before 
making up their minds. 
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Typical Washington Workday 
7:45 a.m.-Meet with CEA staff director on 
day's highlights and review to-
day's newspaper coverage of the 
Administration. 
8:00 a.m.-Daily meeting of White House 
senior staff. Announce morning 
CPI release and answer ques-
tions on the economy. 
8:45 a.m.-Semi-weekly meeting of Cabinet 
Council on Economic Affairs 
(President attending). Make 
pre sen ta tion on economic 
outlook. Answer questions on 
forecasts and policy. Comment 
on Treasury Department presen-
tation on monetary policy. 
9:50 a.m.-Car to Capitol Hill. Review likely 
Congressional questions with 
CEA staff economist. 
10:00 a.m.-Testify on Administration's 
economic policy before Senate 
Banking Committee. Tape brief 
remarks for TV. 
11:50 a.m.-Car to next meeting. Return call 
from White House. 
12:00 p.m.-Address lunch meeting of Na-
tional Convention of Savings and 
Loan Associations. Hold im-
promptu press conference. Con-
tinue interview walking back to 
office. 
2:00 p.m.-Return urgent calls from press 
and interest groups. Review and 
sign key documents. Brief 
meeting with representatives of 
Hispanic groups. 
3:00 p.m.-Make pre sen ta tion on Ad-
ministration's economic policy 
for delegation of local govern-
ment officials at the White 
House. The President makes a 
brief appearance. 
(colltillued 011 11ext page) 
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4:00 p.m.-Meet at CEA with delegates of 
real estate and housing industry 
officials expressing concern over 
high interest rates (at request of 
Chairman of Senate Finance 
Committee). 
4:40 p.m.-Return urgent phone calls. 
5:00 p.m.-Meet with Economic Minister of 
West Germany. 
5:30 p.m.-Review memo to President on 
tomorrow's release on housing 
starts. Call Regan, Stockman, 
Volcker to alert them and 
discuss implications. 
6:00 p.m.-Chair meeting of Council of 
Economic Advisers to review 
work agenda and early planning 
of Economic Report. 
6:30 p.m.-Return remaining telephone 
calls. Talk with CEA staff direc-
tor on way to next meeting. 
7:00 p.m.-Address dinner meeting of NAM 
Board of Directors. 
10:30 p.m.-Return to residence. Read cables 
and papers for tomorrow's 
meetings. 
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